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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: PROOF OF ACCESS
THROUGH STRIKING SIMILARITY
Selle v. Gibb
No. 78 C 3656 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1983)
The plaintiff, Ronald H. Selle, an antique dealer, a part-time
musician and a composer of popular songs, brought this action
against Barry Gibb, Robin Gibb and Maurice Gibb (also known as
The Bee Gees), Phonodisc, Inc. and Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
under the federal copyright laws to recover for the alleged infringe-
ment of a musical copyright. Selle claimed that a song entitled
"Let It End," which he composed and later copyrighted on No-
vember 17, 1975, was copied by the Bee Gees in the form of a song
entitled "How Deep Is Your Love," copyrighted on March 7, 1977
(vocal arrangement copyrighted in November of 1977).
In the absence of any evidence of direct access to his copy-
righted song, the plaintiff sought to prove inferred access through
the doctrine of "striking similarity." After hearing the evidence
presented, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Defendants
then filed a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, or in the alternative for a new trial, and in the event both
motions were denied, for a certificate authorizing an immediate
appeal.
The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and conditionally granted the motion
for a new trial in the event that its grant of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict would be reversed on appeal. The district
court held: proof of copyright infringement through evidence of
"striking similarity" to infer access is rebutted by uncontradicted
evidence of nonaccess and independent creation, such that a ver-
dict by the jury of infringement cannot stand. Selle v. Gibb, No. 78
C 3656 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1983).
The defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was granted on the grounds that the evidence did not sup-
port the jury's finding of infringement. Accordingly, the facts as
presented at the trial will be examined.1
In the fall of 1975, the plaintiff Ronald Selle, a clothing sales-
man in Chicago, conceived a melody while shaving. The entire
1. Selle v. Gibb, No. 78 C 3656 (N.D. I1. July 8, 1983).
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composition was completed in one day. During the following week,
he composed the lyrics and reduced the song to writing in its final
form. He testified that he received no assistance in either compos-
ing the music, or writing the words. He titled the song, "Let It
End." Selle applied for a copyright for the song which was issued
on November 17, 1975.
At the time Selle composed the song, he had a small band of
musicians with whom he played local engagements in the Chicago
area. On two or three occasions, the band performed "Let It End."
Those engagements were the only times that the song was ever
performed in public.
Shortly after receiving the copyright, Selle and his band tape
recorded the song and sent copies to eleven music recording and
publishing companies. Eight of the tapes were returned; three were
not. Selle's song, "Let It End," was never reproduced by any music
company; it was never recorded by any recording company or art-
ist; and the lead sheet to it was never published or sold to anyone.
In May 1978, while working in his yard, Selle heard a song
being played on the stereo of a teenager who lived next door. Selle
thought that the song he heard was "Let It End," although there
"were different words to it and was a different rendition."2 When
Selle asked the teenager the name of the song, he was told that the
song was "How Deep Is Your Love," soundtrack music from a well-
known movie, "Saturday Night Fever." Selle examined the
container of the cassette and noticed that credit for creating the
music was claimed by the Bee Gees, brothers, Barry, Robin and
Maurice Gibb. Paramount Pictures made and distributed the
movie and Phonodisc (known as Polygram Distribution) made and
distributed the cassette tape of "How Deep Is Your Love."
The Bee Gees are internationally known as musical performers
and composers of popular songs. Although they do not read or
write music, they have composed over 160 songs. When they con-
ceive a song, they use a tape recorder. After the song is recorded,
members of their staff reduce the composition to a form that can
be duplicated for sale and used for obtaining a copyright.
Throughout their career of more than 25 years, the Bee Gees had
never previously been accused of copying anyone else's song or
composition.
In January 1977, the Bee Gees, their wives and certain mem-
bers of their staff went to a recording studio located in a chateau
2. Id. at p. 5.
[Vol. 1:139
2
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/9
PROOF OF ACCESS
in France, "to mix a live album and to write a few songs."' 3 Six or
more new songs were composed for the album. While under oath,
Barry Gibb described one particular recording session. Much of his
testimony was supported by the testimony of his brothers and
other members of the Bee Gees' staff who were present.
Barry Gibb described the session as follows: in January 1977,
Blue Weaver, then employed by the Bee Gees as a keyboard
player, was seated at a piano when Barry Gibb said to him, "Play
me a beautiful chord."'4 Weaver then testified that he and Barry
Gibb began to exchange ideas about a song as he played a few
chords. He testified that Barry "would say, 'What was that you
just played' and I would play it again. He [Barry Gibb] would say,
'Yes, that's a nice one. We will use that.' ,5
Weaver testified that in this way "How Deep Is Your Love"
was created. The Bee Gees applied for a copyright for the lead
sheet of "How Deep Is Your Love" which was issued on March 7,
1977. A piano-vocal arrangement was filed in the Copyright Office
in November 1977. Everyone connected with the defendants in the
case testified under oath that at no time before the session de-
scribed did either Weaver or any of the Bee Gees have access to
the plaintiff's song.
The work tape of "How Deep Is Your Love" was admitted into
evidence at the trial. By listening to the tape, the jury was able to
hear the voices of Blue Weaver and Barry Gibb as they created the
song. Barry Gibb testified that his brothers later joined in finishing
the song, and Weaver explained that he took the cassette with him
to London in February 1977.
Other than noting differences in the keys of the demonstration
tape, the lead sheet and the piano-vocal arrangement of "How
Deep Is Your Love," the plaintiff did not dispute, nor contradict
any of the defendants' evidence of nonaccess to his song or their
independent creation of "How Deep Is Your Love."
Traditionally, copyright infringement is proven by ownership
of a valid copyright, access and copying.6 However, since direct evi-
dence of copying is seldom available to the plaintiff, access may be
inferred, and therefore, copying proven, by showing the striking
similarity of the works in question.'
3. Id. at p. 7.
4. Id. at p. 7.
5. Id. at p. 8.
6. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Section 13.01[A], p. 13-3 (1983).
7. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Testa v.
Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
19841
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It is not difficult to conceive of the reasons for the striking
similarity doctrine. One can imagine the hardships suffered by
plaintiffs unable to sustain the burden of proving direct access
even where two works in question are practically identical, and
where the plaintiff's allegedly copied composition has been pub-
licly disseminated. Given the public distribution of a copyrighted
work, and a subsequent "strikingly similar" second work, it ap-
pears just that the plaintiff should not be denied recovery because
of the difficulty of proving direct access.
To prove that the similarities are striking, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that such similarities are of a kind that can only be
explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent cre-
ation or prior common source.' If there is proof of striking similar-
ity which precludes the possibility of independent creation, proof
of direct access is not required.* Expert testimony is required, how-
ever, to prove that two or more works are so strikingly similar that
they can only be explained by copying.10
In Selle, the plaintiff called an expert witness who compared
the two songs and testified that in his opinion they were "strik-
ingly similar." The court noted, however, that on several occasions
the plaintiff's expert refused the opportunity to say that the simi-
larities could only have come from copying.1" The defendants did
not produce expert testimony. Instead, as elaborated upon above,
the defendants' case focused on extensive evidence of the circum-
stances surrounding the independent creation of "How Deep Is
Your Love," together with the testimony of the defendants and
others on their behalf, of nonaccess to the plaintiff's song. All of
this evidence was uncontradicted by the plaintiff.12
This case raises the issue of whether the inference of access
through the proof of striking similarity can be rebutted by uncon-
tradicted evidence of nonaccess and independent creation. It is the
plaintiff's position that proof of striking similarity raises an ir-
rebuttable inference of access and any claims of nonaccess or inde-
pendent creation are irrelevant. The defendants argue that any ac-
cess inferred from the striking similarity of the two songs has been
rebutted by the uncontradicted evidence of nonaccess and the in-
8. Stratchborneo v. ARC Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
9. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Testa v.
Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
10. Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1958); Testa v. Janssen,
492 F. Supp. 198, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
11. No. 78 C 3656 at 12.
12. No. 78 C 3656 at 6-9.
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dependent creation of "How Deep Is Your Love."
In its opinion, the district court considered the evidentiary
value of an inference and noted, that where the case of a plaintiff
is based upon an inference or inferences, it must fail upon proof of
undisputed facts inconsistent with such inference or inferences.13
Faced with plaintiff's uncontradicted expert testimony of the strik-
ing similarity of the two works and the corresponding inference of
access raised by that testimony, as opposed to the defendants' un-
contradicted evidence of nonaccess and independent creation, the
court held that the inference must fail. Judge Leighton noted in
his opinion that, "under this significant circumstance, it matters
not, despite the testimony of plaintiff's expert, how strikingly simi-
lar are the two musical compositions."'
A timely notice of appeal has been filed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the appeal is pending. The
decision on appeal may do much to clarify the significance of the
striking similarity doctrine in copyright infringement cases. In par-
ticular, the decision will test the strength of the inference of access
raised by expert testimony of striking similarity.
In deciding this issue, the court of appeals must bear in mind
the function which the doctrine of striking similarity should serve.
The doctrine should apply to cases in which a copyrighted work
has been publicly disseminated by publishing, recording or large
scale performing. Under these circumstances, an inference of ac-
cess is reasonable, given the wide opportunity for access, particu-
larly when the second work bears striking similarity to the first.
However, such was not the situation in Selle. In Selle, the
plaintiff's song was never publicly disseminated by any medium
through which it could reasonably be inferred that the defendants
had access to it. This fact, coupled with the overwhelming evidence
of independent creation that went uncontested by the plaintiff,
created a situation to which the doctrine should not have applied.
The defendants could have strengthened their position by
presenting expert testimony to contradict the testimony offered by
the plaintiff. Having gone uncontradicted, the jury's finding of
striking similarity based on the expert testimony will be assumed
true on appeal.
Despite this possible error, however, the court of appeals
should affirm the district court. The inference of access must fail
in light of the uncontradicted evidence of nonaccess and indepen-
13. No. 78 C 3656 at 26; Trippy v. Sams, 512 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
14. No. 78 C 3656 at 26.
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dent creation. A work is original and may demand copyright pro-
tection even if it is completely identical with a prior work provided
it was not copied from such prior work but is rather a product of
the independent efforts of its author." To quote Judge Learned
Hand, "independent reproduction of a copyrighted musical work is
not infringement . . ."16 A later Second Circuit opinion noted,
"[M]ere similarity would, of course, be insufficient if the composi-
tions are the fruits of independent conceptions. 1 7 The court's
holding recognizes the situation that may arise, as here, where two
works appear to be strikingly similar yet evidence supports find-
ings of independent creation. In such a case, the uncontradicted
testimony of nonaccess and independent creation should dispel
any inference raised. The very nature of an inference is its logical
relation to proven facts and its natural deduction therefrom. How-
ever, when considered with undisputed facts in opposition to it,
the inference no longer proceeds logically from the facts, and must
fail.
To hold otherwise in this case, would be to disregard extensive
uncontradicted evidence as to the independent creation of the de-
fendants' song. Considered in this light, the decision of the district
court in granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict should be affirmed.
Sandra K. Smokler
15. Novelty Textile Mills Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2nd Cir.
1977).
16. Arnestein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2nd Cir. 1936).
17. Wilkie v. Santly Brothers, Inc., 91 F.2d 978, 979 (2nd Cir. 1937).
[Vol. 1:139
6
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/9
